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We propose a new communication protocol for 
wireless sensor networks, allowing to make them 
secure with respect to malicious attacks. Compared to 
standard secure protocols (e.g., the IEEE 802.15.4 and 
the ZigBee), the one we propose allows to increase 
security significantly, at negligible impact on node 
complexity. A possible hardware scheme to implement 




Modern microprocessors ability to process large 
amounts of data and implement advanced digital signal 
processing is increasingly enabling the successful 
deployment of advanced control systems based on 
remote sensing and measuring [1].  This is opening a 
widespread range of new opportunities to control the 
environment, wildlife habitats, complex industrial 
plants, aerospace vehicle platforms, etc [1]. 
Wireless personal area networks (WPANs), defined by 
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [2], are widely adopted 
within the abovementioned applications, because of 
their low complexity and cost [3]. Particularly, the 
ZigBee protocol [4] is becoming a de facto standard 
for WPANs. 
One important issue for WPANs is their security, in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, 
availability [5, 6]. In fact, differently from a wired 
network, where the information transmitted among 
nodes is confined within a physical medium (a wire), 
in a wireless network the information is exchanged 
among nodes through electromagnetic waves, that are 
broadcasted to the atmosphere. This makes them prone 
to various kinds of attacks that may try to violate the 
security of the network [7, 6] like, for instance, the 
Denial of Service (DoS), the Man-in-the-middle 
(MITM), and the copy and repeat (denoted also as 
replay) attacks [7]. As a consequence, especially in 
case of WPANs employed within control systems for 
safety critical applications (e.g., chemical or nuclear 
industrial plants, aerospace vehicle platforms, etc) it is 
of utmost importance to implement countermeasures to 
guarantee their security [6].  
In order to provide a WPAN with an adequate security 
level, it is essential that the nodes exchanging 
information are able to provide assurance on their 
identity, and that the exchanged information is 
authentic and integral [7, 6].  
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard and the ZigBee Alliance 
protocol provide the communication with some level 
of authenticity and integrity. Particularly, they are able 
to prevent/limit the abovementioned attacks on the 
messages transmitted from the transmitter (master) 
node (Tx) to receiver (slave) nodes (Rx) [2]. 
Reversely, they do not provide any protection to the 
acknowledgment (ACK) message [5], that is sent back 
by the Rx in order to confirm to the Tx that the 
message has been successfully received. The lack of 
protection for the ACK is a serious bug [5], possibly 
harming the security of the whole network. In fact, this 
makes a protocol prone to MITM-like attacks. 
Moreover, in the IEEE 802.15.4 and the ZigBee 
protocols, the message freshness against possible 
replay attacks is guaranteed by a frame counter only. 
This makes the WPAN vulnerable to DoS attacks, for 
instance exploiting the overflow of a frame counter 
[5].  
Based on these considerations, in this paper we 
propose a new, secure communication protocol for 
WPANs, that is able to guarantee message integrity, 
authenticity and freshness for both sender messages 
and acknowledgment messages. Furthermore, our 
protocol prevents the copy and repeat attack by a 
different, and more secure approach, compared to the 
IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee protocols. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we discuss some important security 
problems of standard WPAN protocols. In Section 3, 
we describe our proposed protocol. In Section 4, we 
present a possible hardware implementation of our 
protocol. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Security Problems of Standard Protocols  
 
As introduced above, in standard IEEE 802.15.4 and 
ZigBee Alliance protocols, when the Rx receives the 
message (MSG), it verifies its validity (integrity, 
authenticity and freshness). If the message is valid, 
then the Rx sends an unprotected ACK to the Tx,  _________________________________________________________________________
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concluded upon its receipt, with no check upon the 
ACK authenticity (i.e., its coming from the expected 
Rx node) and freshness (i.e., its being a new ACK, and 
not an old ACK copied and repeated by a non 
authorized node). 
The lack of authentication and freshness verification 
on the ACK could seriously threaten the security of the 
whole network. For instance, let us consider the simple 
case of an attacker trying to avoid that a message 
arrives to the Rx, thus starting a MITM attack. It can 
first simply send an interference noise to the Rx at the 
same time as the Tx, thus preventing the Rx from 
properly receiving the MSG sent by Tx. Afterwards, 
the attacker can send a fake ACK to the Tx. This way, 
since the ACK is not protected, the Tx can be fooled 
that Rx successfully received the MSG. 
Another limit of standard protocols is that they verify 
the MSG freshness by checking a sequence number 
provided by a simple counter. They are consequently 
prone to DoS-like attacks [8]. In fact, as shown in [8], 
such an attack can be carried out by assembling a fake 
message that is compliant with the protocol format and 
by setting its sequence number equal to the maximum 
counting value. This way, the counter of the node 
receiving such a fake message will overflow. This will 
make the counters of the Tx and Rx no longer 
synchronous, so that the Rx will discard all following 
messages from Tx.  
 
3. Proposed Secure Protocol  
 
We propose a protocol to overcome the security 
problems described in the previous section.  
As significant example, we consider the case of a 
master/slave network with one master node, acting also 
as network manager, and several slave nodes. 
However, our protocol can be applied to any kind of 
WPAN by means of straightforward modifications.  
Similarly to the standard IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee 
protocols, our protocol guarantees authentication and 
integrity of the MSG by means of a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) [2], that is generated by 
encrypting the message in clear text by an AES 
algorithm [9]. Moreover, differently from the standard 
IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee protocols, our protocol: i) 
guarantees the authenticity and freshness of the ACK, 
thus avoiding MITM attacks; ii) provides a new 
mechanism to guarantee the freshness of the MSG, that 
is able to protect the WPAN with respect to DoS-like 
attacks.  
To guarantee the authenticity of the ACK, we propose 
to generate a MAC for the ACK, by encrypting the 
ACK in clear text by an AES algorithm [9]. 
To guarantee the freshness of the ACK and the MSG, 
as described in more details later in this section, our 
protocol embeds a rolling code sequence [10] (#seq) 
on both the ACK and MSG, and provides a original 
mechanism to synchronize the Tx and Rx, that makes 
the WPAN immune to DoS-like attacks.  
The general structure of the derived MSG or ACK is 




Fig. 1. Structure of a MAC or ACK of our protocol. 
 
The fields Tx_ID and Rx_ID contain the identification 
codes (IDs) of the transmitter Tx and receiver Rx, 
respectively. The Payload is the useful part of the 
message, containing data, commands or ACKs. The 
field Msg_type indicates the type of message (e.g., 
command, data, ACK, synchronization, etc.) included 
in the payload field. The field #seq contains the current 
sequence number of the rolling code of the node 
(Tx/Rx) sending the message. Finally, the MAC of the 
MSG or ACK is generated by encrypting the first part 
of the message (i.e., Tx_ID, Rx_ID, Msg_type, #seq 
and Payload) by the AES algorithm and a secret key 
km. 
As we can see from Fig.1, the useful message (i.e., the 
whole message, but for the MAC) is sent in clear text. 
This allows to identify the Rx of the message and to 
verify the correctness of #seq without any decryption, 
thus reducing power consumption and the impact on 
communication latency. Of course, this approach can 
not be used if the message carries critical data, while it 
does not give rise to any security flow if the message 
consists of a simple command, as it is usually the case 
in WPANs. 
Let us describe in details how our protocol guarantees 
the freshness of both the AKC and MSG. 
As for the adopted rolling code sequence, it can be a 
pseudo-random sequence, for instance generated by a 
Linear Feedback Shift Register [11]. 
The freshness of the ACK and MSG is verified when 
the rolling code sequences (#seq) in the master (Tx) 
and in the slave (Rx) nodes are synchronized. This is 
achieved in the following way.  
Let’s suppose, as an example, that the WPAN is 
composed by one Tx node (N1), and three Rx nodes 
(N2, N3 and N4), as schematically represented in Fig. 
2. Tx must generate/memorize a different #seq for any Rx node. Thus, in a network of n nodes, Tx must 
generate  n-1 different  sequences (seq(1,i), i=2..n), 
while each Rx must generate only one #seq (the 
respective seq(1,i) sequence), as represented in Fig. 2. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Sequences of the rolling code memorized on a 
master node (N1) and slave nodes (N2, N3, N4). 
 
In our protocol, the synchronism between the #seq of 
Tx and Rx is guaranteed by the ACK. When a Rx (Ni, 
with i=2, 3, 4) receives a message (MSG) from Tx, it 
verifies the authenticity and freshness of the received 
MSG and, in case these verifications are successful, it 
accepts the MSG, updates its seq(1,i) and sends back 
an ACK to Tx (N1). When Tx receives the ACK, it 
also updates its seq(1,i) that is specific to the Rx with 
which it was communicating. Therefore, upon 
conclusion of a successful communication, Tx and Rx 
are synchronized. If Rx (Tx) receives a MSG (ACK) 
with a #seq different from the expected one (e.g., due 
to an attack), Rx (Tx) discards the MSG (ACK) 
without updating its #seq. This way, the 
synchronization of the #seq of Tx and Rx is still 
guaranteed, and the Rx is ready to accept a possible 
new (valid) message from Tx.  
Additionally, our protocol provides a retransmission 
procedure that avoids the loss of synchronism also 
when Tx does not receive any ACK from Rx (e.g., if 
due to excessive noise in the channel, the MSG sent by 
Tx does not reach Rx, or the ACK sent by Rx does not 
reach Tx). After sending a MSG, Tx triggers a timer 
and waits for the arrival of the ACK for a proper time 
interval tw. If after tw Tx has not yet received the ACK, 
it sends again the MSG to Rx and triggers again the 
timer. The tw is chosen large enough to allow the MSG 
to reach Rx and be processed by it, to permit Rx to 
elaborate the ACK, and the ACK to reach node Tx.  
Tx repeats this retransmission procedure till it receives 
the ACK from Rx, or till the maximum number of 
retransmissions (nmax) allowed by our protocol is 
reached. If after nmax retransmissions Tx has not 
received any ACK, it labels Rx as “problematic” node. 
Retransmissions are managed by node Rx as follows. 
When Rx receives a MSG with a #seq equal to its 
previous #seq, then it compares the whole MGS with 
the last MSG received from Tx. If they match, then Rx 
recognizes it as a retransmitted message and sends 
again the ACK to Tx without increasing its #seq.  
Finally, as for the Rx nodes that have been labeled as 
“problematic”, our protocol provides the following 
resynchronization procedure between Tx and Rx. 
Initially, the master Tx starts sending to Rx a 
synchronization MSG (which is built as shown in Fig. 
1, but without any payload) with its current #seqTX. 
When Rx receives this kind of MSG, it makes its own 
sequence #seqRX equal to #seqTX. Then, Rx sends and 
ACK to Tx with #seqRX and increases its sequence by 
1 (i.e., #seqRX+1). When Tx receives the ACK, it also 
increases its sequence by 1 (i.e., #seqTX+1) and sends 
an ACK with the updated sequence to Rx. Finally, 
when Rx receives the ACK, it verifies that #seqTX+1 = 
#seqRX+1. If they are the same, then Rx assumes that 
Tx is an authorized node of the network, thus 
accepting the new sequence. Otherwise, Rx keeps its 
old sequence number. 
 
4. Implementation and Verification 
 
In order to verify the effectiveness of our protocol, we 
designed the Tx and Rx blocks implementing our 
protocol in Verilog and we synthesized them with 
Altera Quartus II [11]. 
As an example, we considered the case of a single 
master (Tx) node and three slave (Rx) nodes (Fig. 2).  
Moreover, we considered a field of 2 bits for the Tx 
ID, for the Rx ID and for the message type, while we 
considered a field of 6 bits for the Payload. 
Additionally, and without loosing generality, we have 
considered a rolling code implemented by a 3 bit 
counter. Finally, we used a 128 bits AES module (i.e., 
input message and secret key of 128 bits) to generate 
the message MAC. Thus, before the encryption of the 
message (to generate its MAC), the message is 
expanded to 128 bits by adding 0s.  
Our implementation of the Tx node is schematically 
shown in Fig. 3. As for the Rx node, its structure is 
very similar and is not shown for space limitation. 
Tx is divided in two functional blocks: i) Tx-part, 
which elaborates the MSGs to be sent to the Rx; ii) 
Rx-part, which controls the ACK messages received 
from Rx. 
As for the Tx-part, it receives as input: i) the ID of the 
Rx (ID_Rx), ii) the message type (MsgT), iii) the 
Payload, iv) the current rolling code sequence number 
(My_RC) of the Tx generated by the 3 bit counter 
RC_Gen, v) the IDs of problematic Rx nodes (ID_PN), 
which are loaded during the initialization phase into a 
proper table within the block Rx_Status.  
Before starting a communication with a Rx, Rx_Status 
verifies that Rx is not a problematic node. If Rx is not 
problematic, Rx_Status sets its output Set_act_com to 





























































































































of the Rx nodes with which Tx has active 
communications) to add the node Rx to the list of 
nodes with active communications. In addition, when 
Set_act_com=1,  Elab_MSG is enabled and starts 
elaborating the MSG to be sent (as in Fig. 1). Then, 
Elab_MSG sets Msg_Ready to 1, to indicate that the 
message given to its output (Out MSG), and loaded 
into the output register reg 3, is ready to be sent.  
Simultaneously, when Msg_Ready = 1: i) the timer 
Start_Tw (which accounts for the maximum time that 
Tx waits for the arrival of the ACK from Rx) is 
enabled, and ii) the counter Count_Ret (which keeps 
track of the number of retransmissions) is incremented 
by one. 
As for the Rx-part, its Verify_ACK block is enabled 
when timeout=1, which takes place when Start_Tw 
reaches its maximum count.  
The block Verify_ACK verifies the correctness of the 
Rx ID and the rolling code sequence (#seq) of the 
received ACK. If the Rx ID is correct and the #seq of 
the ACK is the same as the expected one (i.e., equal to 
My_RC), then Verify_ACK sets the signal Load_ACK 
to 1. When Load_ACK=1, Verify_MAC is enabled. 
This block regenerates the MAC from the clear text of 
the input ACK and compares it with the MAC received 
in the ACK. If both the received and the regenerated 
MACs are equal, then the input ACK is considered 
valid and Verify_MAC sets the signal Valid_ACK to 1. 
This indicates that the communication with Rx has 
been accomplished successfully. Then, Rx is removed 
from the list of nodes with active communications in 
ACL, and RC_Gen increases My_RC by 1.  
Instead, if in the input ACK the IDs of the Rx or Tx 
are not valid, or the #seq is not equal to My_RC, then 
signal Load_ACK = 0 (Load_ACK# = 1) and the input 
ACK is discarded before analyzing its MAC. The input 
ACK is also discarded if its MAC is not correct. In this 
case it is Valid_ACK = 0 (Valid_ACK# = 1).  
When Load_ACK# or Valid_ACK# are set to 1, the 
signal ReTx is set to 1 and the Out_MSG is 
retransmitted to Rx. Then, Start_Tw is restarted, and 
the number of retransmissions is incremented by 1 in 
Count_Ret. If Count_Ret reaches nmax, it sets the signal 




We have proposed a new communication protocol for 
wireless sensor networks, allowing to make them 
secure with respect their most common attacks. 
Compared to the standard IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee 
protocols, our protocol allows to increase security 
significantly, at negligible impact on node complexity. 
Finally, we also presented a possible hardware scheme 
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